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ABSTRACT
Online social networks (OSNs) are platforms to connect and communicate with
friends, families, and like-minded people. Users post thoughts, comment to other’s posts,
share photos and videos, and share information. The shared information often includes
URLs (Uniform Resource Locators), which direct users to web content like news,
articles, and advertisements.
URL sharing is very popular on online social networks. However, URL sharing is
not always convenient because of overly long and complicated URL strings. Thus, short
URLs have become very popular on OSNs because of their simplicity. However, many
risks have been found and reported in association with sharing short URLs. Malicious
users utilize short URLs heavily in their sinister campaigns such as phishing, malware,
spams, and scams. It is highly desirable to design and develop an effective short URL
classifier to mitigate these threats on online social networks.
In this dissertation, we develop a short URL classifier, CONSOL, using the
features collected from online social networks. We achieve an accuracy of 94.5% in
identifying malicious short URLs using Random Forest machine learning algorithm.
Unlike most existing techniques which depend on third party resources to classify URLs,
our classifier does not depend on any third party service providers during its operation
and leverages features available on OSNs only. Our research identifies 16 features that
are important for short URL classification. These 16 features are logically categorized
into three categories, i.e., content features, context features, and social features. Further
analysis reveals that social features contribute significantly towards classifying short
URLs and context features are also good indicators of the malignity of short URLs.
v

Compared to social features and content features, context features are less important.
However, context features complement the classifier to be more effective. The
comparisons of the CONSOL with the existing solution and Google Safe Browsing show
that the classifier is promising in the real world too. CONSOL is slightly better than the
existing solution. However, unlike the existing solutions relying on third party
information, CONSOL runs on its own. Our testing also indicates that CONSOL
identifies malicious short URLs much faster than the Google Safe Browsing. The results
are validated and supported by VirusTotal. Our case studies further demonstrate that
other online social networks can also adopt CONSOL for short URL classification.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Online Social Networks
An online social network (OSN) is a digital platform where users can create their
digital persona with real-life information such as full name, email address, home address,
and phone numbers. This digital persona is used to connect to friends, families,
colleagues, etc. People from different walk of life join OSNs and connect with friends
and like-minded people forming groups. OSN such as Facebook have attracted millions
of users worldwide. According to Facebook, there were 1.09 billion daily active users in
2016 (Facebook, 2016). There are hundreds of different types of OSNs today.
OSNs are places where people are willing to share information. The shared
information is scattered in various data sources, such as user profiles and instant
messages. The shared information is generally available to public and can be retrieved by
users around the world. Because of the massive amount of information collected and
stored on OSNs, it also raises many security and privacy issues (Nepali & Wang, 2013;
Y. Wang & Nepali, 2015b).
Many threats and attacks have been reported on OSNs such as phishing, spam,
scam, malware propagation, and social engineering. Phishing is the most popular attack
among others. In a phishing attack, attackers often trick users to click on URLs or short
URLs and redirect them to malicious websites to steal their sensitive information such as
birthdate, social security number (SSN), and credit card number. Due to the massive
amount of information available and large numbers of unsuspected and vulnerable users,
OSNs are very attractive to attackers. Jagatic et al. (2007) found that users are more
1

susceptible to phishing attacks when social relationships are exploited. According to
research by Kaspersky, 22 percent of phishing scams on the web targeted users on
Facebook in 2014 (Stern, 2014).

1.2 URLs and Short URLs
URLs (Uniform Resource Locators) are pointers to the information on the
Internet. URLs are used to share content on online social networks. However, URL
sharing can be problematic because of its length when shared via posts, messages, and
emails. Particularly, it becomes a huge issue on Twitter. Twitter is a very popular OSN
and has millions of active users. It limits the number of characters (140 characters) for
each tweet that users can post. This led to the popularity of URL shortening services.
URL shortening services take a long URL from users and create a short URL, an alias,
for the long URL. Short URLs can reduce long URLs significantly and make URL
sharing easy. When a user clicks on a short URL, the user will be directed to the URL
shortening service provider, which will then redirect the user to the original long URL or
the “Landing page”. All this happens on the background without any user intervention.
These services have gained popularity ever since they appeared in 2001. As of today,
there are more than 500 URL shortening services on the Internet. Bitly is one of the most
widely used URL shortening service providers.

1.3 Short URL Security
Short URLs are very handy and are easy to share. They save text space and are
easy to manage. Because of these traits, the use of short URLs has skyrocketed in the past
five years. Unfortunately, URL shortening services have been misused by attackers to
spread malicious URLs (Chhabra, Aggarwal, Benevenuto, & Kumaraguru, 2011; Maggi
2

et al., 2013). Short URLs can hide original URL information and may not be related to
them at all in naming. Because of this, users have no idea where the URL directs them to
when they click on a short URL. Attackers leverage this knowledge to their advantage in
nefarious ways, such as phishing scams, spamming, and malware campaigns. Social
networks have been found especially vulnerable to these attacks (Castillo, Mendoza, &
Poblete, 2011) due to large numbers of easy targets, social relationship exploitation, and
high success rate. Jagatic et al. (2007) found that users are five times more susceptible to
attacks when social contexts are used.
Despite the popularity of short URLs, URL shortening service providers fail to
prevent malicious URLs from being converted. In an experiment by Maggi et al. in 2013,
the authors attempted to convert malicious URLs collected from Wepawet, PhishTank,
and Spamhaus against 6 URL shortening services. They found that most of the malicious
URLs were accepted for conversion (Maggi et al., 2013). Online social networking sites
also fail to prevent such malicious short URLs from being posted. There are a couple of
reasons behind this. First, both services often use blacklists to prevent malicious URLs
from being posted. However, blacklists are not always comprehensive and up-to-date.
Second, because a short URL may look completely differently than its full URL, many
current mechanisms cannot provide good results in classifying short URLs. For example,
multiple shortening of a URL will create a completely new short URL, which does not
exist in any blacklists. Heuristics-based malicious URL classifiers are based on URL
specific features, e.g., length, number of dots in URL, etc. These features are not
presented in the short URLs after conversion. This makes conventional filters useless.
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1.4 Leveraging Social Network Features to Detect Malicious URLs
In this research, we investigate how to leverage social network features to classify
malicious short URLs. Previous research exists and utilizes limited features from online
social networks to detect malicious short URLs. However, most of the works rely heavily
on the information derived from third party URL shortening service providers. It is not
always possible to obtain data from third parties provided that there are hundreds of URL
shortening services available to date and many of them are proprietary. In addition, the
results from previous research on short URL classification are also not satisfactory
enough.
Online social networks contain huge amount of information about users, short
URLs, and its propagation. To the best of our knowledge, the information has never been
fully studied and utilized for malicious short URL detection. We believe that malicious
short URLs can be detected using the information from OSNs only because malicious
short URL propagates in online social networks following social phenomenon among
friends and followers. The benefits of the approach can be twofold. First, it does not rely
on the information from third parties. Second, it leverages the vast amount of information
available on OSNs.
The features we investigate on OSNs include content features, context features,
and social features. These features are available on OSNs and are easy to collect. Our
approach utilizes these features to detect malicious short URLs. Our assertion is that
detecting malicious short URLs is practical using information from OSNs only since
malicious short URLs propagate through OSNs leveraging social relationships.
Our research questions in this dissertation include:
4

a) How can we leverage the information available on OSNs to detect malicious
short URLs?
b) What are the most important features for malicious short URL detection?
c) How can we develop an effective mechanism to detect malicious short URLs
with high accuracy on OSNs?
d) Can we adopt the model and use the model for other online social networks
with simple or no changes?

1.5 Contributions
To the best of our knowledge, few works have been conducted in the literature to
study the security of short URLs on online social networks. The contributions of the
research include, but are not limited to,
•

We limited the scope of contemporary short URL classification study to
online social networks.

•

We design and develop a new artifact, CONSOL, for short URL classification.
We demonstrate that the information from OSNs can sufficiently and
effectively classify short URLs with high accuracy. Our evaluation and
analysis show that the classifier achieves comparatively better performance
than the existing solutions.

•

We evaluate the impact of different categories of features in classifying short
URLs and find that social features and content features contribute the most in
classification of short URLs.

5

•

The findings of this dissertation will greatly help short URL classification in
online social networks because the features used in the classifier is freely
available on any online social networks.

The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents a literature
review of the existing research and techniques used for short URL classification. Chapter
3 introduces the research methodology adopted in the dissertation. Chapter 4 introduces
the design and development of the short URL classifier, CONSOL. Chapter 5 further
evaluates and analyzes the performance of the short URL classifier. Chapter 6
demonstrates that the classifier can also be adopted in other online social networks.
Chapter 7 finally concludes the dissertation and summarizes our future work.
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Chapter 2 Literature Review
Online social networks have been found especially vulnerable to privacy and
security attacks due to large number of easy targets, social relationship exploitation, and
high success rate (Castillo et al., 2011). This research focuses on detecting malicious
short URLs on online social networks. This chapter briefly introduces security and
privacy issues on OSNs, how URLs and short URLs are used for malicious purpose, a
conventional way of using blacklists to prevent malicious URL propagation, followed by
a review of existing approaches for malicious short URL detection.

2.1 Privacy on OSNs
Personal information collection and privacy breach are major concerns on OSNs.
Privacy threats range all the way from online stalking, sensitive information leakage,
identity theft (Bilge, Strufe, Balzarotti, Kirda, & Antipolis, 2009), to sexual offense and
physical security. Privacy and security threats are spreading through OSNs (Bilge et al.,
2009; Narayanan & Shmatikov, 2009; Wondracek, Holz, Kirda, & Kruegel, 2010).
However, because of the nature of the threats, attitude towards privacy, and insufficient
knowledge, many people do not report privacy breach. Hence, it is difficult to
quantitatively state the impact of privacy breach.
Many studies have been conducted to address security and privacy issues on
OSNs. A threat modeling framework is presented in (Y. Wang & Nepali, 2015b). It
provides a comprehensive overview of security threats and countermeasures on OSNs. To
measure an individual’s privacy exposure on OSNs, privacy index is proposed (Nepali &
Wang, 2013). Privacy index is a numerical measurement of a user’s privacy exposure on
OSNs (Nepali & Wang, 2013). It considers how much information is disclosed on OSNs,
7

the sensitivity of the disclosed information, and the visibility of that information. Using
privacy index, privacy impact can also be assessed in case a data breach occurs (Y. Wang
& Nepali, 2013, 2015a). In addition to the anonymization techniques used to protect user
privacy such as K-anonymity (Sweeney, 2002) and L-diversity (Machanavajjhala,
Gehrke, Kifler, & Venkitasubramaniam, 2006), privacy index can also be used to monitor
privacy exposure on the Internet and alert users when their privacy exposure changes
dramatically. Other techniques used to protect user privacy on OSNs include, but are not
limited to, P2P architecture (Buchegger & Schi, 2009), and SocBridge (Nepali & Wang,
2014).

2.2 URLs and Short URLs
URL is an abbreviation for Uniform Resource Locator. Defined in RFC 1738 by
Tim Berners-Lee (1994), it is a reference of a web resource located on a computer
network. “URLs are used to `locate' resources, by providing an abstract identification of
the resource location”. RFC 1738 describes the syntax of the URLs. URLs are written as
follows:
<scheme>:<scheme-specific-part>
Schemes can be one of the followings as shown in Table 2-1 according to RFC
1738.
Most of URLs are web addresses, and are represented with http and https schemes
only, such as,
http://www.facebook.com/12345678/photos/98765432111.jpg
https://www.paypal.com/login.php
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Table 2-1 Schemes as Described in RFC 1738
SCHEME
ftp
http
gopher
mailto
news
nntp
telnet
wais
file
prospero

Description
File Transfer Protocol
Hypertext transfer protocol
The Gopher protocol
Electronic mail address
USENET news
USENET news using NNTP access
Reference to interactive sessions
Wide Area Information Severs
Host specific file names
Prospero directory service

For the context of this research, we are particularly interested in http and https schemes.
Short URLs appeared around early 2000s to make URL sharing simple and easy.
Sharing a long URL is complicated and consumes significant text space. It becomes a
huge issue when a limitation of maximum text space is applied on users. For example,
Twitter limits the text messages to 140 characters. This led to the significant increase in
the adoption of short URLs. The use of short URLs was slow in the beginning but
became popular in mid-2000s. Today, there are more than 500 URL shortening service
providers, public or proprietary, on the Internet.
A short URL is an alias of a URL that is shorter in length, as its name suggests,
compared to the original URL. URL shortening services take a long URL from users and
create a corresponding short URL. A short URL is created by appending hash of a URL
submitted by the user to the URL shorting service provider’s domain name. For example,
using Bitly, the long URL, www.dsu.edu/research/informationassurance/shorturls.html, is
hashed to generate a unique string ‘ab7cde8’. The hashed string is then appended to the
service provider’s domain name to generate a short URL, http://bit.ly/ab7de8. Service
providers also provide options to generate user desired domain strings, known as branded
9

short name domains, to replace the providers’ domain names. Users are able to create a
custom unique string, known as custom alias, and use it to replace the hash value. For
example, using custom string xyz.ly/ as a branded short name domain, all the short URLs
the user creates are automatically generated in the form of http://xyz.ly/abcdef.
Research found that short URLs can reduce the length of the URLs up to 91%
with 54% overhead in latency (Antoniades et al., 2011). When users click on a short
URL, they are directed to the service provider. The service provider will perform a look
up against its database with the short URL and return the corresponding long URL to the
browser. The browser will then redirect the user to the original long URL “Landing
Page”. All of these processes happen automatically without user intervention as shown in
Figure 2-1:

Figure 2-1 Short URL Working Mechanism

2.3 Malicious URLs
A URL is an address of content, information, or a document on the World Wide
Web (Berners-Lee et al., 1994). The address stores the document or the information of
interest. While some web content is genuine, some content might be infected with
unwanted programs like viruses, spyware, malware, etc. Unfortunately, URLs can be
10

used to direct users to malicious content. A URL which points to an infected file location
or a fake web service location with the intent of causing harm to the user’s computer
system is a malicious URL. Some malicious URL mimic genuine web application and
lure users to disclose personal sensitive information, which otherwise they would not
disclose. This is known as phishing attacks (PhishTank, 2016c).
Malicious URLs studied in this research include, but are not limited to, the
phishing URLs that are intended to steal personal login credentials, the URLs that can
spread malware by exploiting browser related vulnerabilities, the spam URLs that lure
users to undesired content, and the scam URLs that lure users to activities that they
otherwise would not do.

2.4 Blacklist
Blacklist is used to register known entities that are malicious in nature. Blacklists
are used for different purposes. Examples of blacklists include DNS blacklist, software
blacklist, etc. URL blacklist contains URLs that are known to be malicious. These URLs
can be part of a phishing campaign, a scam campaign, or a malware campaign. Many
techniques are used to populate backlists. One of the most popular technique is based on
user voting (PhishTank, 2016a). This is particularly famous for phishing URLs. Users
can flag any suspected URLs. The experts in the community will then manually verify a
suspected address and add the verified phishing address to a blacklist. Automated
analyzing techniques can be used to identify the URLs, which contain malicious content
too. These techniques include, but are not limited to, signature analysis for malicious
payload, sandboxing (Malwareblacklist, 2016), and machine learning (Developers, 2015).
Signature analysis for malicious URL detection is an active detection mechanism where
11

signatures for malicious purposes, e.g., malicious code and credential harvesting, are
analyzed within the content of the URL. Sandboxing includes opening the suspected
URL in a sandboxed environment and analysis for any registry changes, zero-day
exploits, and credential harvesting. Machine learning uses different features (e.g., lexical,
host based, and other) to identify if a URL is malicious or not.
In this research, we use two very popular blacklists from VirusTotal and
PhishTank to label URLs. PhishTank is a very popular phishing blacklist service operated
by OpenDNS (PhishTank, 2016b). It provides APIs for developers to perform lookups for
malignity of a URL or a batch of URLs. The results can be obtained in a JSON or XML
format as requested by the user. VirusTotal is another popular web-based blacklist. It
generates a report for malicious links scanned by 56 website scanning services.
VirusTotal also provides APIs for developers to integrate the labeling service into their
systems. The report is retuned in JSON or XML format per request (Virustotal, 2015).
The results can then be utilized as desired by the applications.

2.5 Malicious URL Detection
Malicious URL detection in general can be categorized into two approaches,
active detection mechanism and passive detection mechanism. Active detection
mechanism classifies a URL based on the content of the URL. An automated process
retrieves and analyzes the content of the URL. Different approaches can be utilized to
analyze the content, for example, file analysis, sandboxing, etc. However, attackers can
leverage evasion techniques like selective forwarding where scripts can manipulate the
automated process to obtain genuine content, and redirect real users to malicious content
or temporal behaviors (K., C., J., V., & D., 2011; Rajab et al., 2011). Passive detection
12

mechanism classifies URLs based on the features from different sources without actually
visiting the URL. Literature suggests the use of host based and lexical features (Ma, Saul,
Savage, & Voelker, 2009a; McGrath & Gupta, 2008) are very popular. Passive detection
mechanism is suitable when visiting the actual URL possesses risks or obtaining the
actual content might not be possible. In this research, we use passive detection
mechanism.
Most of the malicious URL detection approaches are based on machine learning.
The remaining chapter reviews the machine learning approaches for malware detections,
particularly the approaches to classify malicious URLs in general and the approaches to
classify short URLs. Note that most of the techniques for malicious URL detection do not
apply to short URLs. The chapter also reviews other approaches for malicious URL
detection.
2.5.1

Machine Learning Approaches
Machine learning is a technique where computers make intelligent decision based

upon the data provided. It has been used in many fields of information security. Machine
learning is believed as the most important technique in classifying URLs in both
academia and industry.
2.5.1.1 Malicious URL Detection
Malicious URL detection typically leverages lexical features and host-based
features. Lexical features are the textual characteristics of the URL, for example,
presence of ‘.’, ‘/’, ‘?’, ‘=’, ‘-’, etc. The attempt is to find the properties of malicious
URLs which look differently from the genuine URLs. For example, a malicious URL,
www.ebay.com.payment.net, is different from a typical URL, www.ebay.com. McGrath
13

and Gupta (McGrath & Gupta, 2008) and Kolari et al. (2006) suggested a set of lexical
features to be studied while classifying URLs. McGrath and Gupta (2008) found that
phishing URLs look differently than the brands they target. However, they contain 5075% keywords that are similar. Phishing URLs tend to be longer in length. Phishing
domains tend to be shorter in length, use fewer vowels, and have fewer unique characters.
Kolari et al. (2006) studied presence of words, anchors, metadata, 4grams and used
machine learning approaches to classify spam blogs. Blum et al. (2010) leveraged lexical
features for online learning of phishing URL detection. In addition to page content, they
used 8 different previous studied URL features and introduced 3 new features in
classification. They also used social reputation features from social media. Le et al.
(2011) used lexical features of URLs to classify phishing URLs. They showed that lexical
features alone can effectively classify phishing URLs and achieved accuracy up to 97%.
Whittaker et al. (2010) developed a classifier to maintain Google’s phishing blacklist
using lexical features along with the content features and the reputation-based features
obtained from Google. The classifier achieved 90% accuracy and maintained false
positive below 0.1%.
Host based features include, but are not limited to, WHOIS record, geographic
information, domain name properties, and IP address properties. The idea behind the
approach is that malicious sites are hosted with less reputable services (Ma et al., 2009a).
Studies have found that many malicious website are hosted on compromised client
machines and malicious URLs often include IP addresses, domain tasting (Kolari et al.,
2006), etc. The classifier from Whittaker et al. (Whittaker et al., 2010) also utilized host
based features in addition to the content features, the lexical features, and the reputation-
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based features. Ma et al. (Ma et al., 2009a) developed a classifier to detect malicious
URLs and achieved 95-99% accuracy. Their studies suggested the power of host-based
features in malicious URL detection. Ma et al. (2009b) further extended their studies to
perform a large scale online learning of suspicious URLs and used lexical and host-based
features to classify malicious URLs. It achieved an accuracy of 99% on a balanced
dataset. Similar works have been conducted in other areas such as phishing URL
detection.
2.5.1.2 Malicious Short URL Detection
Malicious short URL detection in social networks has gained many attentions
recently. Although studies suggested the use of short URLs by malicious users happened
long time ago (McGrath & Gupta, 2008), short URL research did not attract many
interests. The first large scale exploratory research on short URLs was done by
Antonaides et al. (Antoniades et al., 2011). They found that short URLs are mostly
popular on OSNs. The short URLs are used to point to news and informative content and
have word of mouth propagation on OSNs.
First ever study on the security implications of short URLs was conducted by
Maggi et al. (Maggi et al., 2013) over the course of two years. They found that short URL
service providers fail to prevent malicious URLs from conversion. They also found that
Bitly accepted a malicious URL for conversion even if it flagged the URL as malicious.
All of the services under study check the URLs when submitted. However, attackers have
full privileges of the website they control. They can inject the malicious content into their
website after the security check and convert a valid short URL address to a malicious
short URL. This is a real problem with URL shortening services. Maggi et al. (2013) also
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discovered that 95% of the malicious short URLs had life span of 4 days. Almost every
URL shortening service security mechanism can be bypassed. Wang et al. (2013) studied
the misuse of short URLs. They leveraged characteristics of spam URLs and developed a
mechanism to detect them. The authors used click-traffic features from Bitly to develop a
classifier and achieved accuracy up to 90.81% using Random Forest algorithm. Data
labeling was performed using known suspended accounts, Google Safe Browsing,
McAfee Site Advisor, URIBL, SURBL, and Spamhaus. Lee and Kim (2013) developed a
mechanism to detect suspicious URLs in real time from twitter stream. Attackers also
implement techniques to evade malicious URL detection, e.g., redirecting automated
tools used by researchers to benign pages. Lee and Kim (2013) studied the redirection
cases and developed a mechanism to leverage attacker’s URL redirection chain and tweet
context. They developed a classifier with nearly 92% accuracy. Their approach was
experimentally proven to be more effective than the mechanism used by Twitter. Gupta,
Aggarwal, & Kumaraguru (2014) conducted exploratory study on Bitly’s spam
URL/account detection mechanism. They found that suspicious Bitly account could
undertake prolonged malicious activities and remain undetected. They used short URL
features and two domain specific features to classify Bitly short URLs and achieved an
accuracy of 86%. Klien and Strohmaier (2012) discovered that 80% of the shortened
URLs contained spam content and the problem persisted on the global scale. They
suggested the need of the research for techniques to discover malicious short URLs. Our
research on malicious short URL classification can be found in (Nepali, Wang, &
Alshboul, 2015).
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2.5.2

Other Approaches to Detect Malicious URLs
Several other techniques have been proposed and used in the literature to classify

URLs. The most popular approaches used are voting and crowdsourcing. Voting is the
process where users provide their opinions on the malignity of the URLs. Usually, the
process starts by some users/volunteers posting a suspected URL for voting in the
community. The experts in the community then vote on the malignity of the URL. If
enough votes are cast on the malignity of the URL, it is considered malicious. The
malicious URLs are registered in the blacklist and distributed for public use. One of the
most popular service that follows this approach is PhishTank (2016b).
Crowdsourcing follows the similar approach of voting except millions of users
provide the review rather than a small group of experts in the community (Wikipedia,
2015). The users for crowdsourcing can be normal users as well as experts. One of the
most popular services is Web of Trust (WOT, 2016). Web of Trust is available as an addon module on many browsers. Millions of users provide safety ratings on different
websites based on their opinions of a web page. Users can check the ratings in the form
of different signals, e.g., green for safe and red for malicious, for the trustworthiness of a
website.
The problem with these techniques is that it takes long time for the malicious
URLs to appear on a blacklist. It also suffers from human errors due to subjective
judgment on a web page.

2.6 Summary
Malicious short URLs detection is challenging. Many approaches used for URL
classification do not work well for short URLs. Current mechanisms for short URL
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classification depend on third party information, which limits its availability. Our
literature review indicates more research needs to be conducted on malicious short URL
classification. An effective short URL classifier is highly desirable on online social
networks.
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Chapter 3 Research Methodology
There are two dominant research approaches in information systems, i.e., design
science approach and behavioral approach (Hevner, March, Park, & Ram, 2004). Our
research follows design science approach. This chapter compares these two approaches
and also summarizes how we apply design science approach to our research.

3.1 Design Science vs. Behavioral Research
Information systems research deals with artificial phenomenon which can be
created and studied (March & Smith, 1995). According to Simon (1986), natural science
is about understanding of how and why things work while design science is about
building an artifact that can be utilized to achieve goals. Design deals with the invention
of a new artifact. Design science research differs from routine design because the
knowledge required to develop the artifact does not exist (Vaishnavi & Kuechler, 2004).
Design science research results in an artifact that solves problems in information systems.
Such artifacts can be constructs, models, methods, and instantiations (March & Smith,
1995).
Behavioral research in information systems has its root on natural science and it
tends to develop and justify theories. Theories explain the natural phenomenon of
interactions between information systems and its environment. Theories help develop
valuable artifacts that meet their purposes in the design process. Without complete
understanding of its environment and the interactions of an artifact with its environment,
an artifact may fail and produce undesired outcomes (March & Smith, 1995). Design
science is technology-oriented and aims to develop things that serve human purposes. In
the process, design science consumes the theories developed by natural science to build
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an artifact that meets its goals. Artifacts developed are used in information systems to
interact with environments, and hence are bound by natural theories. Design science and
behavioral research have different focus. Both paradigms are required and they
complement each another.
In this research, we follow design science principle. Our objective is to develop
an innovative artifact to solve a critical issue in information systems.

3.2 Design Science Research Methodology
Design science research in information systems has its roots in engineering
(Simon, 1986). The main goal of design science research is to create innovative ideas and
practices which result in efficient and effective design, management, and use of
information systems (Denning, 1997). The output of design science, artifacts, can be in
the form of software, formal logic, mathematical function, or informal natural language
descriptions (Hevner et al., 2004). The artifacts of design science can be divided into four
types, i.e., constructs, models, methods, and instantiation (March & Smith, 1995).
Construct is a natural language, which describes a concept and characterizes a
phenomenon. Models describe tasks at a higher level. Methods describe set of activities,
which should be performed to meet the goal. Instantiation produces products such as
software and processes. Design science goes through a building and evaluating cycle
(March & Smith, 1995). During the building phase, an artifact is built to perform certain
objective. The main goal in this phase is to prove that such an artifact can be built.
Evaluation deals with developing the criteria for performance assessment.
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We follow Peffers et al. (2007)’s design science research approach for this study.
Figure 3-1 shows our approach for this research.

PROBLEM
IDENTIFICATIO
N
Effective
mechanism to
classify short
URLs on Online
Social Networks.

OBJECTIVE
Develop
efficient
classifier that
uses content,
context, and
social attributes
from OSN.

DESIGN &
DEVELOP
MENT
CONSOL:
short URL
classifier on
OSNs.

DEMONSTRATION
Demonstrate
with real
dataset the
performance
of CONSOL.

EVALUATION
Evaluate the
effectiveness
of the
classifier.

COMMUNICATION
Communicate
the findings
with
publications
in IS journal
&conferences

Entry Point
Problem
centered
initiation

Figure 3-1 Research Methodology (Adopted from Peffers et al., 2007)
Peffers et al. suggested six stages in design science research, i.e., problem
identification and motivation, definition of the objectives for the solution, design and
development, demonstration, evaluation, and communication. We adopt Peffers et al.’s
research methodology in the design of malicious short URL classifier.
I.

Problem Identification and Motivation: During this stage, specific
research problem is identified and the importance to solve the problem is
justified. Requirements for such a system can also be identified whenever
possible. Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 describe the problem and the motivation
for this research.

II.

Definition for the Objective: Quantitative or qualitative objective is
derived from the problem definition in this stage. The objective of this
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research is to develop an effective short URL classifier using the features
from OSNs as shown in Chapter 1.
III.

Design and Development: Artifact is designed and developed in the form
of construct, model, method, or instantiation in this stage. The artifact
should meet its functionality. The design and development of the
malicious short URL classifier are presented in Chapter 4.

IV.

Demonstration: In this stage, the ability of the artifact to solve intended
research problem is demonstrated. This can be achieved in terms of
experiment, simulation, case study, etc. Chapter 4 includes experiments
demonstrating the ability of the short URL classifier.

V.

Evaluation: The artifact’s performance is measured in terms of preestablished criteria and metrics. Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 perform
quantitative analysis of the performance of the artifact and measure how
well the objectives of the research are met.

VI.

Communication: The outcomes of this research, its relevance, utility, rigor
in the development of the artifact, and effectiveness are presented in major
conferences like AMCIS and HICSS.

3.3 Machine Learning
Machine learning is the study of computer algorithms that improve automatically
through experience. “A computer program is said to learn from experience E with respect
to some class of tasks T and performance measure P, its performance at tasks in T, as
measured by P, improves with experience E” (Mitchell, 1997).
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Machine learning depends on the objective of the task and is broadly classified
into three categories, i.e., supervised learning, unsupervised Learning, and reinforcement
learning. Supervised machine learning requires labeled data and is concerned with
identifying the relationship between the data and the label. Label refers to the possible
outputs, e.g., malicious or benign, good or bad, etc. Unsupervised learning does not
require labeled data and deals with the patterns inherent in the data to find the hidden
relationships, e.g., social network analysis. Reinforcement learning operates in a dynamic
environment and learns to perform certain tasks, e.g., automated driving, playing poker,
playing chess, etc.
We studied machine learning algorithms available and heavily used in the
community and identified the most popular algorithms in the similar research to be tested
for our classifier. Datasets include labeled datasets with training and testing datasets.
Labeled datasets contain fields such as short URLs, features, and tags that represent
malignity of short URLs.
We selected Twitter as a case because Twitter is one of the most widely used
OSNs. URLs are collected along with user information from tweets using Twitter’s
streaming APIs (Twitter, 2015). For simplicity, we focus on Bitly short URLs since Bitly
is the most widely used URL shortening service to date. Tweets with Bitly URLs are
collected. Content, context, and social information are extracted from tweets. Tweet
related information such as clicks, favorites, and retweets are also collected. The
relevance of a tweet will be determined using tweet trends. Twitter provides top 10
popular trends at any given point in time. It is believed that attackers also leverage
relevant context information to spread malicious URLs. As we collect tweets, global
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tweet trends are also collected per minute for the classifier. To simplify the study, nonEnglish tweets are removed.
Extracted short URLs are expanded to long URLs using Bitly APIs. The long
URLs are then submitted to popular web URL scanning services such as VirusTotal and
PhishTank to obtain the labeled dataset. VirusTotal generates a report for malicious
URLs from 67 website scanning services. Some of the popular scanning services
VirusTotal uses include Alienvault, Avira, BitDefender, ESET, Google Safe Browsing,
Kaspersky, PhishTank, Sucuri and Sophos, etc. The report is retuned in JSON format
(Virustotal, 2015). The landing page of the deferred redirection URL will be determined
and submitted to VirusTotal for analysis. PhishTank is another blacklist service operated
by OpenDNS (PhishTank, 2016b). It provides developers and researchers open APIs to
download blacklists and look up if a particular URL is a malicious URL. The results are
returned in JSON or XML format. The results are analyzed to detect malicious nature of
the URL. A labeled dataset is created from the results.
After collecting all the desired information, the features that are unique for
malicious short URLs are investigated. We leverage the knowledge from the literature to
derive significant signatures for malicious URL detection. Features are then evaluated to
find out the most relevant feature set to be used in our classifier.
Using the labeled dataset and the feature set determined, a classifier is developed
using different machine learning algorithms. The best performing algorithm is then
identified and carried on for further evaluation. Note that our classifier leverages third
party information from Bitly, VirusTotal, and PhishTank in the training phase. However,

24

the classifier operates independently to detect malicious short URLs on online social
networks without relying on any information from third parties including blacklists.
3.3.1

Supervised Machine Learning
In this research, we use supervised machine learning. Supervised machine

learning leverages a labeled dataset, which contains independent variables and
corresponding dependent variable. Independent variables are the features used in the
learning process and dependent variables are the different classes that the instances
belong to. The objective is to infer a function that maps out the relationship between the
independent and dependent variables and utilize the function to make similar predictions.
In this research, the dataset contains the features extracted from the tweet data and the
corresponding label from the blacklist lookup.
The features are further classified into three categories, i.e., content features,
context features, and social features. Content features are derived from tweet text only,
e.g., length of tweet, bag of words, and number of URLs. Bag of words are created from
tweet contents including malicious URLs. This is based on frequency analysis of the
words in tweets. Context features are derived from the contextual information in a tweet,
e.g., relevance, and user mentions. Social features are derived from the social information
in a tweet and the user profile, e.g., friends and followers.
After the features are extracted, different machine learning algorithms are used to
develop a classifier. 10-fold cross validation is used to minimize the bias in training. We
test different machine learning algorithms including Random Forest algorithm, Support
Vector Machine (SVM), Naïve Bayes algorithm, and Logistic Regression algorithm
(Waikato, 2015). The selection of these machine learning algorithms is based on the
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literature and tools available. The results will be further analyzed and the best
classification algorithm will be identified.
3.3.2

Machine Learning Algorithms
Algorithms are instructions that must be followed to reach a desired result. In

machine learning, these algorithms define the steps to build an optimized model from the
data to make predictions. Many algorithms exist and could be used depending upon the
type of task as mentioned earlier. In this research, we select four heavily used machine
learning algorithms in the URL classification community, namely, Random Forest,
Support Vector Machine, Naïve Bayes, and Logistic Regression.
3.3.2.1 Random Forest
Developed by Leo Brieman (2001), Random Forest algorithm is one of the most
famous algorithm for classification task. It contains an ensemble of classification trees
where each tree depends on the values of a random vector sampled independently and has
same distribution. Let ‘n’ be the number of training observations with ‘N’ number of
features (dimensionality). To determine the decision node at a tree, we choose k << N as
the number of variables to be selected. We select a bootstrap sample from n observations
in the training set and use rest of the observations to estimate the error in the testing
phase. ‘k’ is chosen randomly as a decision at a certain node and the best split is
calculated based on k. Trees are never pruned in order to achieve low bias.
There are several advantages of random forest. First, it can handle large number
of features. Second, during forest building phase, it generates unbiased estimation of
generalization error. Third, it handles missing data well. However, Random Forest lacks
reproducibility as the process is random.
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3.3.2.2 Support Vector Machine
Support Vector Machine is a widely used state-of-the-art binary classifier
especially when dimensionality or number of features is high. The objective is to derive
an optimal separating hyperplane between two classes by maximizing the margin
between the class’s closest points. Suppose we have a linear discriminating function and
two linearly separable classes with target values +1 and -1.
The equation for the hyperplane is:
𝑤 ! 𝑥! + 𝑤! > 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑡! = +1

(1a)

𝑤 ! 𝑥! + 𝑤! > 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑡! = −1

(1b)

where 𝑥! is any point in the data, 𝑡! is the target value and w is the normal vector to the
hyperplane. The distance of 𝑥! to a hyperplane is |𝑤 ! 𝑥! + 𝑤! |/||w||, and the distance to the
origin is |𝑤! |/||w||.
Although SVM is very popular, it suffers from several drawbacks. First, it
requires huge number of computations to train the data. In other words, SVM is
computationally intensive. Second, it is very sensitive to noisy data and hence it is prone
to overfitting.
3.3.2.3 Naïve Bayes
Naïve Bayes classifier is built on the basis of Bayes Theorem (Bayes, 1763) in
probability theory and statistics. It defines the probability of an event based on the related
events. Suppose A and B are two events, and P(A) and P(B) are the corresponding
probabilities of those events to occur. Then, according to Bayes Theorem, the probability
of event A provided event B is true is:
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𝑃 𝐴𝐵 =

! ! !(!|!)
!(!)

(2)

It is a simple yet powerful and very famous algorithm used in many machine
learning applications. Naïve Bayes is a probabilistic classifier that works efficiently when
the dimensionality of feature vector is high and individual features are distributed
independently. Let P (x|y) denote the conditional probability of the feature vector ‘x’ with
the label ‘y’. Then,

𝑃 𝑥𝑦 =

!
!!! P(x ! |y)

(3)

From Bayes Theorem, assuming malicious and benign URL having equal probability, the
posterior probability that feature vector x belongs to malicious URL is:

𝑃 𝑦=1𝑥 =!

!(!|!!!)
! !!! !!(!|!!!)

(4)

3.3.2.4 Logistic Regression
Logistic regression is the most widely used algorithm in classification problem. It
is a binary data prediction model. It is modeled based on the probabilities of possible
outcomes in a single trial using logistic function or sigmoid or logit function represented
as:
!(!;!)

𝑙𝑜𝑔 !!!(!;!) = 𝛽 ! 𝑥

(5)

where x is a vector of p predictors and 𝛽 is a p x 1 vector of regression parameters.
Although it is similar to linear regression, Logistic Regression differs in
assumption that conditional distribution is Bernoulli distribution and probabilities are
restricted to 0 or 1. Logistic regression is represented as:
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log

!(!)
!!!(!)

= β! +

β! x !

(6)

3.4 Summary
We adopt and use Peffers et al.’s research methodology for this dissertation work.
Our objective is to design an effective malicious short URL classifier using the features
collected from online social networks. The method used for the classifier is machine
learning. We will identify the best machine learning algorithm and the most effective
feature set for malicious URL classification in the research.
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Chapter 4 CONSOL: An Online Social Network Based Short
URL Classifier
System development is a systematic process including defining problem,
designing and developing solution, testing, and implementing the solution. Problem
definition states the information system problem that the new system is attempting to
solve. Design provides a blueprint that describes the architecture of the artifact to be
developed. Development uses the design to bring the new system to life. Testing is a
process of testing whether the functional and non-functional requirements derived from
the problem definition are met. Finally, system development is also an iterative process.
One may have to go back and address the problem in the system at any phase during the
process.
Our main objective in this research is to develop a classifier that can effectively
classify short URLs using the features collected from an online social network. In order
to develop a system and meet its intended objective, its internal structure, working
mechanisms, input, and output must be carefully designed. This chapter presents our
design and development of the short URL classifier, CONSOL.

4.1 CONSOL Classifier
Our literature review indicates that the existing works do not provide a
satisfactory solution. First, existing solutions rely on the information acquired from third
parties. However, it is not always possible to obtain information from a third party
service provider. There are hundreds of URL shortening service providers on the Internet.
Some of them are free such as Bitly, TinyURL, Google, Owly, and Twitter. Some of
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them are proprietary service providers such as New York Times, Washington Posts,
Juniper, and Cisco. A few service providers provide APIs (Application Program
Interface) for other parties. However, APIs from service providers is not always
available. Many proprietary service providers do not provide any information to use their
services. Second, the accuracy obtained from the existing solutions is not satisfactory.
The best accuracy achieved in classification is 90.81% by Wang et al. using click traffic
features (D. Wang et al., 2013). We believe a more effective classifier for short URLs can
be developed using the information available on OSNs.
We argue that features from OSNs alone can be used to effectively classify short
URLs. The information available on OSNs includes, but is not limited to, personal
information, social information, membership information, user posts, etc. OSNs also
contain information like group membership, social graphs, user connections, friends,
followers, etc. All of the information has unique characteristics and should be studied
thoroughly. We aim to leverage the information available on OSNs to develop a classifier
for malicious short URLs. The success of this research will have a significant
contribution in the information security community and particularly in the URL
classification and social media security.
4.1.1

Conceptual Model
The proposed classifier model is shown in Figure 4-1. The model meets the goal

of leveraging features from online social networks to develop a classifier for short URLs.
The principle used in the development is as follows:
“Any social network users have social structure and generate content based upon
certain context”.
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Therefore, we propose to use the features from social networks to classify short
URLs. The features are broadly classified into three main categories, i.e., content
features, context features, and social features. The terms are self-explanatory but will be
defined and explored later in the chapter.

Online Social Network
Content
Features
Context
Features

Classifier

Social Features

Figure 4-1 Conceptual Model for CONSOL
4.1.2

Architecture Diagram
The architecture diagram of the CONSOL is shown in Figure 4-2. It includes 4

components, i.e., streaming data collector, data preparation, feature extractor, and
machine learning. Machine learning consists of two sub-components, i.e., labeling and
classifier.
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Context
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Results

Figure 4-2 Architectural Diagram
Streaming Data Collector: Streaming Data Collector is responsible for collecting
data from Twitter. Twitter’s streaming APIs are used to collect data. Twitter provides
data in JSON format. The JSON data is parsed using a python script. Desired data will be
collected and stored in a flat file. We are particularly interested in the tweets that include
Bitly short URLs. Tweets that do not include Bitly short URLs will be skipped in the
process.
Data Preparation: The data collected by the Streaming Data Collector contains
huge amount of information. Only a handful of information is required to develop a
classifier. The rest is considered as noise and irrelevant information. Irrelevant
information such as profile picture, background color, contributors, translator, protected,
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and truncated will be removed. Data Preparation also deals with the data with errors and
missing values and prepares them for further processes.
Feature Extractor: Feature Extractor extracts relevant features from tweets and
OSNs. Initial features are selected based on the literature review. We classify the features
into three categories, i.e., content features, context features, and social features. Feature
selection will help assess the contribution of each category for short URL classification.
Machine Learning: Machine Learning consists of two parts. First, a labeled
dataset is created using blacklisting service. Second, a classifier is developed for
malicious short URLs.
•

Labeling: Labeled dataset is obtained by performing URL lookup against
blacklists such as VirusTotal and PhishTank. The labels are represented in
binary format, 1 for malicious and 0 for benign. We use two blacklist services,
i.e., VirusTotal and PhishTank, to create the labeled dataset. After cleaning
the data, full URLs of the corresponding short URLs are retrieved from Bitly.
Each URL will be checked against the two online URL scanning services. A
labeled dataset will be created from the results.

•

Classifier: Artifact will take the labeled dataset and train itself using 10-fold
cross validation using a machine learning algorithm to build a classifier. The
classifier will then predict the malignity of the short URLs using a new set of
testing data. Performance metrics will be computed for each machine learning
algorithm. The algorithm, which performs the best, will be used for further
analysis.
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4.2

Data Collection
Data is collected from Twitter using Twitter’s Streaming APIs (Twitter, 2015).

Streaming APIs provide access to Twitter’s global stream of tweets. There are several
challenges in the data collection. First, the volume of data can grow significantly.
Collecting one hour of tweets requires more than 10 GB of space. Due to the limitations
of our storage space, the data has to be trimmed. Since we are only interested in the
tweets including Bitly short URLs and the rate of the data fluctuates, the program needs
to consume the data quickly without breaking the API connection to the Twitter. To
address these issues, we decided to slightly process the data while collecting it. We
remove the information that is irrelevant to our goal. The information removed from the
tweets includes profile background color, profile picture, and background theme. We
adjust the script such that minimal processing is conducted, not to exhaust storage, during
data collection without breaking the connection. The data is collected in JSON format
(“Introducing JSON,” 2015).
Tweets are very large in size and arrive at a high rate. We did not collect the
tweets for 24 hours continuously during a day. Tweets were collected for a few hours in a
different time interval during a day to enrich the diversity of the data. There are millions
of tweets in a typical day. If we capture all tweets, it will take significantly long time just
to label the data. In this study, we collected tweets for 3 hours at a different time every
day over the course of a week in April 2015. We collected 1.75 million tweets during the
data collection period. Our final dataset contains almost 40GB of data.
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4.2.1

Tweet Data
The fields in a tweet contain the necessary information about the tweet, the user,

and the contents it possesses. Without proper understanding of the data, it cannot be
processed properly and the expected results cannot be achieved. The data returned from
the Twitter Streaming APIs is in JSON format. The JSON file includes different attributevalue pairs or fields. A typical tweet contains the following fields:
Tweet Information: This field is at the beginning of the tweet. It contains tweet
specific information such as creation time and date, tweet ID, tweet text, source of tweet,
if a tweet is truncated, geographical information, coordinates, place, contributors, retweet
count, and favorite count. However, the contents may vary depending upon the type of
tweets (e.g., retweet, replies).
User Information: This field contains the information specific to the creator of a
tweet. It contains user’s unique user ID, name, screen name, location details, user URL,
description, protected, verified, friends count, followers count, account creation date,
time zone, etc. If a tweet is retweeted, the information about the retweet is also contained
in this entry.
Entities Information: This field contains other information about a tweet. It
contains all the hashtags, URLs and their corresponding full URLs (Twitter automatically
shortens URLs), user mentions (name, id, etc.), any symbols, etc. Note that if a tweet
includes multiple URLs, each URL will have its separate entry in the tweet.
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4.2.2

Data Labeling
Data in nature has certain characteristics to categorize them. For example, photos,

videos, music, and books can be classified into different categories such as happy, action,
romance, sad, and adventure. Data can be labeled using human intelligence.
Labeling data is the process of tagging the data with a meaningful ‘tag’ to
represent which category it belongs to. In our case, we are interested in two categories,
i.e., malicious and benign. Labeling data is very important process in supervised machine
learning. After the labeled data is obtained, appropriate machine learning algorithms can
be applied to derive mathematical model that represents the relationship between the data
and its tag.
We leverage popular blacklist services to label our dataset. The short URLs are
extracted from tweets and their corresponding long URLs are extracted using the URL
shortening service. Bitly APIs and python script are used to obtain the corresponding full
URLs. The full URLs are then submitted to the blacklist service to determine the
malignity of the URLs. The results are returned in JSON format and parsed by a script to
obtain the label in binary format, i.e., 1 representing malicious URL and 0 representing
benign URL. The results are then used to label the data. The blacklist services used in our
research are VirusTotal and PhishTank. We rely heavily on the VirusTotal because
VirusTotal scans a URL using 56 different online services. If any of the 56 services labels
the URL as malicious, the URL is considered malicious.
There are several challenges when performing lookups against the blacklist
services. The API service from these blacklists usually comes with a low rate of lookups.
We were able to request a higher rate for academic research and obtained a daily lookup
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rate up to 60,000 URLs/day from VirusTotal. Since the lookup rate from VirusTotal was
satisfactory for our purpose, we use the VirusTotal as the main blacklist service in this
research. PhishTank was used to label small datasets during the earlier phase in this
project. Note that PhishTank result is also obtained from the VirusTotal.
Among all the 1.75 million tweets, most of the entries are not found in the
blacklist. Our goal is to create a labeled dataset. Thus, the short URLs whose status
cannot be identified were skipped. Some of the URLs took long time for processing. For
those URLs, we tuned our script not to retrieve the results. Many of the tweets contained
foreign languages and caused processing errors. We decided to remove all those tweets
for simplicity. Our final labeled dataset (DS1) contains 50,291 true positive entries and
410,362 true negative entries.

4.3 Social Network Features
As shown in Table 4-1, features can be broadly classified into three categories,
i.e., content features, context features, and social features. All three categories of features
can be found on social networks.
Content Features: User-generated content is one of the main characteristics of
online social networks. Users of OSNs produce massive content on a daily basis. On
average, 58 million tweets are generated on Twitter alone (Brain, 2015). User-generated
content includes messages, photos, videos, URLs, etc. In this research, we target to use
content features for URL classification. In particular, content features we study include
length_of_tweet, number_hashtags, number_urls, and words from bag-of-words such as
contains_string_check, contains_string_watch, contains_string_sex, contains_string_klik,
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contains_string_click,

contains_string_amazing,

contains_string_interested,

and

contains_string_single. These features can be derived from the tweet contents.
Context Features: Context features include the environment or settings where an
event occurs. Tweets carry information related to an environment. It usually contains
information related to news, photo sharing, web content, emotions, etc. Context of a
tweet can reveal lots of information about a particular tweet and its content. In this
research, we leverage five context features, i.e., in_reply_to_status, in_reply_to_user,
retweet_count, favorite_count, and relevance. The first four features are simply obtained
and extracted from a tweet. Relevance is obtained by leveraging tweet trends. Twitter
produces top tweet trends using an algorithm around a user’s location and around the
globe. The idea is to determine the hottest topics matching a user’s interests. We define a
tweet is relevant if the tweet contains any top 10 trends at the time of tweet collection.
Our program collects a list of top trends on twitter USA every minute during data
collection phase. A python script was developed for the purpose.
Social Features: OSN contains huge amount of social information. This
information conveys a lot about the user and the user’s interests. Typical social
information

contains

friends,

followers,

family,

personal

information,

group

memberships, number of posts/tweets, etc. Social features also contain information about
how the user’s messages/posts/tweets are absorbed in social networks. In this research,
we use the social features that are directly obtained from a tweet. In particular, we
leverage six social features, i.e., friends_count, followers-count, favorites_count,
user_following, statuses-count, and follow_req_sent.
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Table 4-1 summarizes all the features, the category they belong to, and their
descriptions.
Table 4-1 Features and Their Descriptions
Categories
Content

Context

Social

SN

Features

Description

1
2

Length_of_Tweet
Contains_str_check

Length of characters in tweet
If word “check” exists in tweet

3
4
5
6
7

Contains_str_watch
Contains_str_sex
Contains_str_klik
Contains_str_click
Contains_str_amazing

If word “watch” exists in tweet
If word “sex” exists in tweet
If word “klik” exists in tweet
If word “click” exists in tweet
If word “amazing” exists in tweet

8

Contains_str_interested

If word “interested” exists in tweet

9

Contains_str_single

If word “single” exists in tweet

10

Number_hashtags

How many hashtags does the tweet has?

11

Number_URLs

How many urls does the tweet have?

12

In_reply_to_status

If tweet is in reply of other tweets

13

In_reply_to_user

If tweet is in reply of other user

14

Retweet_count

How many retweets user has made?

15

Favorite_count

How many users favorited the tweet?

16

Relevance

Contains any relevant trends?

17

Followers_count

How many followers user has?

18

Friends_count

How many friends user has?

19

Favorites_count

Haw many tweets are favorited by user?

20

Statuses_count

How many tweets user has made?

21

User_following

How many other users, she is following?

22

Follow_req_sent

Is any follow request sent?

Bag-of-words technique has been heavily used in the field of data mining such as
information retrieval and natural language processing (Salton & Michael, 1983). The idea
is to represent the text as a bag full of words disregarding its grammar but maintaining its
multiplicity. In this research, we use bag-of-words technique to derive popular words in
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true positive set of malicious tweets. The result from bag-of-words is used as content
features in our classifier.
We derive bag-of-words by using a simple technique. We leverage frequency of
words as a factor for selection of words. The principle behind frequency of words is that
the words with higher occurrence are the words of value. We retrieved the top 100 words
based on the frequency of occurrence and performed manual inspection to remove stop
words and non-relevant words. The labeled dataset (DS1) is parsed to collect the tweet
contents from the true positive malicious entries. The tweet contents are then processed
using the python script to count the frequency of words. The script generates a list of top
100 words, which were analyzed manually to select the top 8 words after removing the
non-significant words such as articles, pronouns, URLs, hashtags, etc. Figure 4-3 shows
the frequency of these words.

Figure 4-3 Frequency Table for Bag-of-Words
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4.4 Feature Selection
Feature selection deals with the process of identifying the most important features
and removing the irrelevant features. It seems that more features should result in higher
performance of an algorithm. However, it is not the case. Having irrelevant features can
make the model over fit. Overfitting is the problem in machine learning where the model
performs very well during training and performs poorly when it is tested. To achieve the
best performance of a machine learning algorithm, all the irrelevant features must be
excluded.
Feature selection is often confused with feature extraction. While the latter deals
with the creation of new features by utilizing the original features, the former deals with
selecting the best subset of features that performs well. Feature selection algorithms can
be generalized into two categories, i.e., wrapper methods and filter methods. Wrapper
methods evaluate the features based on their worth with the learning algorithm. Filter
methods evaluate features using heuristics on the characteristics of data (Kohavi & John,
1997).
Our preliminary analysis of the dataset found that four features in our dataset do
not have any variance. In another words, the values of these features are all the same; in
this case it is all zeros. Particularly, retweet_count, favorite_count, user_following, and
follow_req_sent are the features with zero values. We decided to immediately remove
these features from the feature set because these features are not relevant in predicting
malignity of short URLs.
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We use filter method in this research. InfoGainAttributeEval function from Weka
is used for feature selection. InfoGainAttributeEval evaluates the information gain with
respect to the target class.
InfoGain(Class, Attribute) = H(Class) – H(Class | Attribute)
The InfoGainAttributeEval function returns the features and their ranks based on
the information gain with respect to the target class. Table 4-2 shows the output of the
function. The decimal number before the features represents the information gain of that
particular feature with respect to the target class.
Table 4-2 Output of InfoGainAttributeEval Function of Weka
Information Gain Attribute Number
0.2682333
0.1631349
0.1427712
0.127612
0.0601966
0.0379317
0.0364155
0.0185196
0.0181032
0.0121861
0.0068112
0.0059014
0.0046924
0.0034791
0.0028035
0.0020062
0.0000726
0.0000124

16
13
14
1
10
12
15
2
17
6
11
3
5
4
8
18
9
7

Attribute Name
Statuses_count
Followers_count
Friends_count
Length_of_tweet
Relevance
In_reply_to_user
Favorites_count
Contains_str_check
Number_hashtags
Contains_str_Click
In_reply_to_status
Contains_str_Watch
Contains_str_Klik
Contains_str_Sex
Contains_str_Interested
Number_URLs
Contains_str_Single
Contains_str_Amazing

4.5 Evaluation Metrics
Evaluation metrics establish the baseline for evaluating the performance of the
artifact. Table 4-3 Evaluation Metrics shows the evaluation metrics used in the research.
This metrics is widely adopted in machine learning community.
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Table 4-3 Evaluation Metrics

Actual

Malicious
Benign

Predicted
Malicious
Benign
TP
FN
FP
TN

True positive (TP): TP is the correct identification of truly malicious URL as
malicious.
True Negative (TN): TN is the correct identification of benign URL as benign.
False Negative (FN): FN is the incorrect identification of malicious URL as
benign.
False Positive (FP): FP is the incorrect identification of benign URL as malicious.
We will also look at precision, recall, F-measure, and the accuracy of the
classifiers.
Precision (P): is the rate of correctly identified malicious URLs to all instances.
Recall (R): is equivalent to TP.
F-measure (FM): Harmonic mean between precision and recall.
Accuracy (A): measures the overall rate of correctly detected malicious and
benign URLs to all instances.
𝑇𝑃

𝑃 = (𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑃) ……………………….. (1)
𝑇𝑃

𝑅 = (𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑁) …………………………(2)
𝑃∙𝑅

𝐹𝑀 = 2 ∙ 𝑃+𝑅 …………………………(3)
(𝑇𝑃+𝑇𝑁)

𝐴 = (𝑇𝑃+𝑇𝑁+𝐹𝑃+𝐹𝑁) ……………….(4)
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4.6 Dataset Description
We created different datasets for the development, analysis, and evaluation of our
classifier. The purpose to have many different datasets is to make sure our results are
consistent. The datasets vary in size for the purpose they serve. DS1, DS2, and GDB1 are
three completely different datasets. They were collected at different time during the
testing. RDB1 is a labeled dataset derived from DS1. WDB1 and RDB2 are two labeled
datasets derived from DS2. Finally, GDB1 is completely new dataset for comparison
against Safe Browsing. Table 4-4 shows the datasets we used in this research.
Table 4-4 Datasets and Description
Purpose

Dataset

1. At the end of
collection

a. DS1

2. Training and
Testing

a. RDB1

a. DS2

a. WDB1
3. Evaluation

b. RDB2

c. GDB1

Description

Characteristics

Labeled dataset at the Total:
460,653
end of data collection
entries
Malicious:
50,291
Benign: 410,362
Balanced dataset created Total:
100,580
by reducing the false entries
entries in unbalanced Malicious: 50,291
dataset collected DS1
Benign: 50,289
Labeled dataset at the Total: 30,100 entries
end of collection. This Malicious:
5600
dataset is used to derive Benign: 24,500
WDB1 and RDB2
Dataset
created Total: 10,881 entries
following the approach Malicious: 5454
used by Wang et Al. Benign: 5427
from DS2
Evaluation
dataset
created to compare the
classifier to Wang et.
Al’s method from DS2
Unlabeled Dataset to
compare the performance
in real-world

Total: 10,908 entries
Malicious: 5455
Benign: 5453
Total: 9986 entries
Unlabeled
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The data collection, processing, training, and testing were performed on a
MacBook Pro with 2.9 GHz core i7 processor and 16 GB of RAM. Program was written
in python programming language using Eclipse IDE (Integrated Development
Environment). Python is a general purpose interpreted programing language and provides
huge community support. It is rich in libraries for machine learning and data mining
projects. Some of the libraries used in our research include Scikit-learn, Pandas, and
Graphlab.

4.7 Classifier Training and Preliminary Testing
In machine learning, training a classifier refers to providing a labeled dataset to a
machine-learning algorithm, which will derive a mathematical function that explains the
relationship between the data and the corresponding label. The mathematical function
derivation is an iterative process in which the algorithm goes through multiple iterations
to minimize the error. The error refers to the difference between the prediction and the
actual value. The algorithm tunes the parameter for the features depending on the error
value to minimize the error. The final result is a mathematical model that represents the
relationships between the input features and the label. The mathematical model is then
tested against a new testing dataset to measure the effectiveness. This new testing dataset
should not be the one that is used in training phase. The effectiveness of the model is
usually measured in terms of accuracy.
As mentioned earlier, we chose four machine learning algorithms, i.e., Random
Forest, Support Vector Machine, Naïve Bayes, and Logistic Regression, for the short
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URL classifier. The algorithms are selected from the literature review based on
community tools and existing technique approaches.
The labeled dataset used to train and test the classifier in this research is RDB1.
We use 10-fold cross validation technique to utilize our dataset fully. K-fold cross
validation, also called rotation estimation, is the technique of randomly splitting dataset
into k mutually exclusive subsets (folds) of approximately equal size. Then, the classifier
is trained k times using (k-1) subsets and tested against 1 subset at each iteration. The
accuracy is computed at each iteration for the testing dataset. Finally, overall accuracy is
computed as a mean of accuracies at each iteration.
We take the results from feature selection with InfoGainAttributeEval from
Weka. We perform several tests on the features to find the best feature set. We decide to
remove that feature which has the lowest information gain, one at a time and run the
selected algorithms with 10-fold cross validation. The procedure is repeated until all but
one feature is removed from the model. The lowest ranking feature removed at an earlier
phase is not added back to the feature set while moving forward in the test. Our
objective is to minimize the error. We compute Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) at
each run. The model with the low RMSE, the best accuracy, precision, recall, and Fmeasure and the corresponding feature set is recorded and selected for further
evaluation. The results of the four algorithms are shown in the figures below.
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Figure 4-4 RMSE Logistic Regression

Figure 4-5 RMSE Naive Bayes
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Figure 4-6 RMSE Support Vector Machine

Figure 4-7 RMSE Random Forest
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Figure 4-4 RMSE Logistic Regression to Figure 4-7 RMSE Random Forest show the
changes of RMSE values in each iteration, removing one feature at a time. In Figure 4-4,
using Logistic Regression, we achieve the lowest RMSE when removing only one
feature, contains_str_amazing, from the feature set. Hence, it contains all the other
features in the Information Gain that rank above contains_str_amazing. The same concept
applies to all other machine learning algorithms and the results are shown in Table 4-5.
Table 4-5 Performance Metrics for Feature Selection
Algorithms

RMSE

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

F-Measure

Naïve Bayes
Logistic
Regression
SVM
Random
Forest

0.479

61.052

0.639

0.611

0.590

0.449

67.652

0.709

0.677

0.664

0.493

75.718

0.813

0.757

0.746

0.207

94.502

0.945

0.945

0.945

Table 4-5 Performance Metrics

shows the RMSE and performance metrics computed

from our testing using the best feature set, i.e. with lowest RMSE, for each machine
learning algorithm. As shown in the table, Random Forest algorithm outperforms all
other algorithms significantly in every aspect: RMSE, precision, recall, f-measure, and
accuracy. Random Forest has the lowest RMSE, highest accuracy, highest precision,
highest recall, and highest F-measure. The closest rival to Random Forest is Support
Vector Machine algorithm with only 75.718% accuracy, 0.813 precision, 0.757 recall,
and 0.746 f-measure. The RMSE for Random Forest is 0.493, significantly higher. This is
a significant difference in all aspects. Our testing also reveals the best feature set for the
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Random Forest algorithm as shown in Table 4-6 Selected Features for Random Forest with Filter
Method.

Table 4-6 Selected Features for Random Forest with Filter Method
S.N
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

FEATURES
Length_of_tweet
Contains_str_Check
Contains_str_Watch
Contains_str_Sex
Contains_str_Click
Contains_str_klik
Contains_str_interested
Relevance
In_reply_to_status
In_reply_to_user
Favorites_count
Friends_count
Followers_count
Statuses_count
Number_hashtags
Number_URLs

Note that the four algorithms evaluated achieve the best performance with
different feature set. Figure 4-8 also indicates that Random Forest algorithm outperforms
all other algorithms significantly for malicious short URL classification.
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Logistic Regression
Accuracy

Naïve Bayes

F-Measure
Recall

Random Forest

Precision
Support Vector Machines
0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

Figure 4-8 Testing Results
Wrapper method was not selected for feature selection because of its complexity
and the limitation of computing resources available during the research. However, the
problem with feature selection using filter method is that the model tends to bias. To
validate the results, we also applied wrapper method on Random Forest algorithm to
compare the performance from filter method. Our objective here is to show that we
achieve accuracy significantly close to that of wrapper method despite not using the
wrapper method for feature selection.
We run Weka with wrapper method on RDB1 dataset using 10-fold cross
validation and best-first search approach. The results are shown in Figure 4-9 Results of
Wrapper Method Feature Selection.
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Figure 4-9 Results of Wrapper Method Feature Selection
As shown in Figure 4-9, the wrapper method selected 13 features for the
classifier. We tested the short URL classifier again using the Random Forest algorithm
and the 13 features from the wrapper method. The results are shown in Table 4-7
Wrapper Feature Selection Result.
Table 4-7 Wrapper Feature Selection Results
Algorithms

RMSE

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

F-Measure

Random
Forest

0.207

94.54

0.946

0.945

0.945

Comparisons between Table 4-5 Performance Metrics and Table 4-7 Wrapper
Feature Selection Result show that the filter method performs significantly close to the
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wrapper method. Thus, our testing in Table 4-5 Performance Metrics using filter method
is appropriate. The features selected from filter method and wrapper methods are very
similar. Filter method selects three more features, i.e., click, klik, and interested, than
wrapper method. A close comparison of the filter method and the wrapper method could
be further investigated in the future.

4.8 Summary
We design and develop a classifier, CONSOL, for malicious short URLs. The
classifier utilizes features such as content features, context features, and social features
available on online social networks to identify malicious short URLs. The classifier relies
on blacklist services for training purpose. However, the classifier does not depend on any
third parties during its operation. We test four machine learning algorithms, i.e., Random
Forest, Naïve Bayes, Support Vector Machine, and Logistic Regression, for the classifier.
Our testing indicates that Random Forest algorithm outperforms all other algorithms with
94.5% accuracy with its closest rival at 75% accuracy. We further evaluate the best
feature set for the Random Forest algorithm and identify 16 important features for short
URL classification. Our testing also shows that the Random Forest algorithm performs
equally well using filter method and wrapper method.
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Chapter 5 Evaluation and Results
We present the design and development of the short URL classifier, CONSOL, in
Chapter 4. Our testing shows that the Random Forest algorithm performs the best among
all the machine learning algorithms tested. However, there are more questions to be
answered to assess the performance of the classifier, e.g., how well CONSOL performs
compared to other existing approaches, how the accuracy changes with respect to features
in different scenarios, and what the misclassified malicious short URLs have in common.
This chapter further evaluates the effectiveness of the CONSOL compared with the
existing solutions and Google Safe Browsing.

5.1 Comparison against Existing Work
To further evaluate the performance of CONSOL, we looked at how CONSOL
performs when compared with other approach in the literature. As discussed in the
literature review, there has been little research conducted on short URL classification.
Among all the related work, the research conducted by Wang et al. (2013) is particularly
interesting because their research leverages click-traffic features obtained from the URL
shortening service providers to classify short URLs. In our research, we target to show
that short URLs can be classified using the features obtained from the OSNs and it can
still achieve high accuracy. Thus, we chose Wang et al.’s work to be compared with the
CONSOL.
Wang et al. (2013) studied the misuse of short URLs and the characteristics of the
spam and benign short URLs using a case study. The findings are then used to detect
spam URLs on Twitter. Specifically, Wang et al. used click-traffic features for spam
URL detection. They collected tweets including Bitly URLs and retrieved the click traffic
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features using Bitly APIs. They utilized 9 click traffic features to develop the classifier
and achieved an accuracy of 90.81% using Random Tree algorithm. Their dataset
contains 641,423 short URLs (18,496 spam, 622,927 genuine).
We decide to leverage the same raw data to minimize the bias in order to make
the results comparable. We leverage WDB1 and RDB2 datasets, which contain Bitly
short URLs prepared from the same raw dataset DS2. WDB1 dataset contains the features
used in Wang et al.’s study. RDB2 dataset contains the features for the CONSOL. WDB1
has 10,881 total entries with 5,427 malicious and 5,454 benign entries. RDB2 has 10,908
total entries with 5,453 malicious and 5,455 benign entries. Note that there is slight
difference in the number of entries. This is due to the error in data processing in the
program. We skipped few URLs due to long processing time when labeling data. We then
run 10-fold cross validation using the four different algorithms on both datasets. The
results are shown in Table 5-1.
Table 5-1 Comparison against Wang et al.
Algorithms

WDB1
Pr

RDB2

Rc

FM

Acc

Pr

Rc

FM

Acc
93.71%

Random Forest

0.926

0.924

0.924

92.25%

0.939

0.937

0.937

SVM

0.915

0.908

0.908

90.80%

0.817

0.741

0.725 74.139%

Logistic
Regression
Naïve Bayes

0.705

0.704

0.703

70.37%

0.764

0.763

0.762 76.256%

0.612

0.590

0.569

59.00%

0.739

0.719

0.713

71.89%
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Figure 5-1 Graphical Representation of Comparison against Wang et al. (WDB1)
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Figure 5-2 Graphical Representation of Comparison against Wang et al. (RDB1)
The result in Table 5-1 show that CONSOL performs slightly better than the
approach used in Wang et al.’s work. Random Forest algorithm outperforms all other
algorithms in the study. In Wang et al.’s approach, Support Vector Machine performs
very close to Random Forest algorithm as shown in Figure 5-1 Graphical Representation
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of Comparison against Wang et al. (WDB1) while others fall far behind. In CONSOL
approach, the results are fairly consistent. The results demonstrate that short URLs can be
effectively classified using the features from online social networks and still achieve high
accuracy.
Wang et al. achieved 90.81% accuracy using their dataset in their original work.
Using WDB1, we are able to achieve 92.25% accuracy using Random Forest algorithm.
This increase in accuracy can be explained by the objective and the use of the dataset.
The study by Wang et al. focused on spam short URL detection while our objective is to
classify short URLs in general as benign or malicious which includes spam URLs as
well. Wang et al. used 5 different public blacklists to label the data, i.e., Google Safe
Browsing, McAfee SiteAdvisor, URIBL, SURBL, and Spamhaus. Our implementation
uses the blacklist from VirusTotal which scans the URLs from 56 different online URL
scanning services. Finally, their dataset was heavily unbalanced and the authors did not
provide any information on balancing the dataset. We believe the discrepancy is due to
the different blacklists used, unbalanced dataset, and the objective of the research.

5.2 Comparison against Google Safe Browsing
To evaluate the effectiveness of the CONSOL in real world scenario, we also
compare the results of our classifier with Google’s Safe Browsing blacklist. The
objective of this comparison is not to compete CONSOL against Safe Browsing since
Safe Browsing is usually updated after rigorous process based on machine learning as
well as manual analysis. Safe Browsing is a blacklist maintained and updated by Google.
It can be used by other applications to look up URLs for malignity. The blacklist contains
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phishing URLs, malware URLs, and unwanted software pages. The whole URL labeling
process is complex and out of the scope of this dissertation.
We compare the performance of CONSOL against Google Safe Browsing
blacklist. We collect the tweets including ‘unlabeled’ Bitly short URLs, extract the
features, and then classify short URLs using CONSOL. The results from our classifier are
then compared against Google Safe Browsing blacklist.
We convert the short URLs obtained from the tweets to their corresponding full
URLs. We then identify the URL malignity using Google Safe Browsing service. Since
Google Safe Browsing APIs limit the rate of lookup to 10,000 URLs per day, we collect
10,000 tweets including short URLs for the evaluation purpose (GDB1). Literature
suggests that it takes up to 23 days for the malicious URLs to appear on blacklists (Sheng
et al., 2009). We perform the lookup against the Safe Browsing service continuously
every day for up to 23 days. We also perform lookup on 30 days, 45 days, and 60 days.
The results (Figure 5-3 Comparison against Safe Browsing) are then used to compare the
effectiveness of our classifier.
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Figure 5-3 Comparison against Safe Browsing
CONSOL is able to label 503 entries from GDB1 as malicious short URLs on
Day 0. There was no malicious short URL detected by Google Safe Browsing. On 4th and
5th days, Google Safe Browsing detected one new URL as malicious that was not labeled
by CONSOL. However, on the 5th day, Google Safe Browsing labeled the earlier detected
malicious short URL as benign. We believe it was a false positive from Safe Browsing.
We were interested to see how Safe Browsing performs in comparison to the CONSOL.
Thus, we ran the test until 23rd day. However, Safe Browsing caught none of the URLs
during the 23 days. This led us to seek other ways to verify whether the URLs caught by
CONSOL were indeed malicious.
Several techniques exist and can be used to check for the malignity of a URL,
e.g., using sandboxing or manual analysis, etc. In this research, we decide to leverage
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VirusTotal blacklist in order to confirm the malignity of the URLs flagged by the
CONSOL.
On 30th, 35th, and 40th day, Safe Browsing flagged one URL as malicious, which
was not detected by the CONSOL. We performed lookup against VirusTotal from 35th
day. On the 35th day, VirusTotal caught 45 URLs as malicious, which were also
identified by the CONSOL. On the 45th day, Safe Browsing again removed the URL
which was labeled as malicious earlier. VirusTotal identified the same 45 URLs as
malicious on the 45th day. Safe Browsing did not catch any other URLs till 60th day of
our experiment. VirusTotal caught 46 malicious URLs on the 60th day.
The results show that indeed CONSOL performs well in the real world. We were
not able confirm how many of the short URLs caught by CONSOL are malicious due to
the time constraint. However, our comparisons show that the results from the CONSOL
are trustworthy and promising.

5.3 Analysis of Content, Context, and Social Features
We are also interested to assess the contribution of each category of features to
the overall performance of CONSOL. We analyze the performance of each category
using RDB1 dataset. We split the RDB1 dataset into training and testing sets with 7030% split respectively. Our training set contains 70,406 entries and our test set contains
30,174 entries. We ran the Random Forest algorithm on the training set to train the
classifier and test the classifier using the testing dataset. We achieved an overall accuracy
of 93.24% on the testing dataset with all features.
Table 5-2 Accuracy of the Classifier with Different Feature Sets
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Feature Sets
All features
Social features only
Content features only
Context features only

Accuracy
93.24%
91.47%
70.58%
40.92%

As shown in Table 5-2, the social features alone can accurately classify 91.47% of
the total malicious short URLs. Content features can classify 70.58% of the total
malicious short URLs while context features can classify only 40.92% of the total
malicious short URLs. From Table 5-2, it is clear that social features are the most
powerful features with higher predictive power. After social features, content features
perform well but are significantly poor than social features. The performance of the
context features is very poor in identifying malicious short URLs. Hence, social features
and content features are more effective than context features when used to identify
malicious short URLs.
To measure the percentage of short URLs correctly predicted by each category of
features, we added an ID field in the dataset using Weka, to identify each unique short
URLs. We tested the classifier with combined features and each feature set separately and
exported the results to a CSV file. We then parsed the CSV file to identify the unique
short URLs classified by each category. The process was repeated for all three categories
and the combined feature set. The results are shown in Figure 5-4. Note that the testing
here is slightly different than the testing in Chapter 4. Previous tests in Chapter 4 used
10-fold cross validation. The dataset here is split into training and testing sets with 7030% split. This is because we want to identify the short URLs that are caught by each
category of features and to achieve that we need to make the dataset stable. The result is
shown in Figure 5-4
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Figure 5-4 Common Short URLs Caught by Each Category of Features
From the analysis in Figure 5-4, we found that only 27.44% of the short URLs are
caught by all three categories of feature sets. Figure 5-4 also proves that social features
are indeed the most powerful features and contributes extra 16.50% unique short URLs.
Content features contribute 1.87% unique short URLs that are not caught by any other
categories while context features only contribute 0.7% unique short URLs. However,
there are 0.52% of the short URLs that are not caught by either of the individual feature
sets but are caught when combining all features together. This shows the accumulative
power of the features.

5.4 Theoretical Analysis
Empirical evidence on the predictive capability of different sets of features
suggests that social features have significant power to classify short URLs. Results from
Table 5-2 shows that social features alone can predict malignity of short URLs with up to
91.47% accuracy. This can be supported by the fact that malicious users have more
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control to change the content and the context of the tweets. However, their social
structure is more rigid and less flexible to change. This is also supported by the existing
literature. Yang et al. found malicious users’ social network forms a small–world network
and can be detected using social relationships and semantic coordination (Yang,
Harkreader, Zhang, Shin, & Gu, 2012). Stringhini et al. found a pattern in spammer’s
profiles and leveraged those patterns to classify profiles in social network (2010).
Content features are able to predict with 70.58% accuracy as shown in Table 5-2.
This result is less than expected. This can be due to the fact that the content features do
not have much difference between malicious and benign posts. This can be justified by
the fact that malicious users have more control over how they present their tweets and
thus short URLs to evade detection. For example, a malicious user can post a malicious
short URL with different tweet length, keywords, hashtags, along with genuine URLs.
Context features have poor predictive capability with accuracy of only 40.92%
(Table 5-2) although some features are very prevalent with malicious postings, e.g.,
relevance. Predictive capacity of context features is low. It might be due to the few
context features we have in the classifier.

5.5 Analysis of Missing Short URLs
CONSOL achieves an accuracy of 94.5% for short URL classification. We are
interested in analyzing the remaining 5.5% of the URLs that were missed in our
classifier. For this purpose, we write a python script to collect all the features for those
missed short URLs in RDB1 dataset. This sample contains false positive and false
negatives prediction from our classifier on the RDB1 dataset. We then perform analysis
on each category of features individually to find out the cause why those short URLs are
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missed. Based on the statistical characteristics (mean, standard deviation) of all the
features, we did not find any unusual characteristics on these entries. In the case of false
negative entries, the only justification is that these tweets are posted from compromised
accounts or social network users post tweets including short URLs unaware that they are
malicious.

5.6 Summary
To further evaluate the performance of the CONSOL, we compared the CONSOL
with the existing work by Wang et al. As shown in our testing, our classifier performs
slightly better than Wang et al.’s work. Note that Wang et al.’s work uses click traffic
features obtained from Bitly while our classifier achieves slightly better performance and
does not depend on any third parties during its operation. We also compared the
performance of CONSOL against Google Safe Browsing. We found that CONSOL
performs better compared to Safe Browsing in true positive detection and speed of
detection. We also performed theoretical analysis of why CONSOL works better. The
use of social features is observed to be very powerful in classifying short URLs. For
those malicious short URLs missed in the classifier, we found that there are no statistical
anomalies in the missing short URLs.

65

Chapter 6 CONSOL to Other Online Social Networks
Our evaluation and analysis in 55 show that the short URL classifier, CONSOL,
is practical and effective compared to the existing solutions. We design, develop, and
evaluate the classifier using the data collected from Twitter. There are hundreds of OSNs
all over the world. While business models for these services may vary, the general
principles in which they operate are the same. All the online social networks possess
information that can be further classified to content features, context features, and social
features. Thus, it is very likely that these OSNs can also use CONSOL for short URL
classification. This chapter demonstrates how CONSOL can be applied to other social
networks. We select two OSNs for the case studies, i.e., Facebook and LinkedIn. These
two OSN services have different business models. However, both services are widely
used.

6.1 Case I: Application to Facebook
Facebook is the most popular OSN to date. It is a general purpose OSN. It is
designed for audience from every walk of life and contains materials about everything.
According to Facebook, there are 1.13 billion daily active users as of June 30, 2016 and
1.03 billion of them are mobile users (Facebook, 2016). Facebook users come from
different fields, professions, and countries and have different interests. Almost 84.5% of
the total users on Facebook are outside US and Canada (Facebook, 2016). The numbers
speak itself for the popularity of Facebook. Facebook is estimated worth $245 billion
according to CNN (Monica, 2015).
Users can create profiles with their personal information and post photos, posts,
emotions, locations, videos, etc. on Facebook. Other users can follow, add as friend, and
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communicate with them. People can also create a group, which can be joined by others
with similar interests or create a closed group which can be joined only upon request and
acceptance. Short URLs are also very popular on Facebook. Many people share web
content with their friends, or as group posts. These short URLs could be malicious and
can spread malwares to users’ computers.
CONSOL utilizes social network content, context, and social features to classify
short URLs. Our objective here is to demonstrate that Facebook contains the features that
can be used by CONSOL for short URL classification.
6.1.1

Social Features
CONSOL uses 4 social features for short URL classification, i.e., Friends_count,

Followers_count, Favorites_count, and Statuses_count. Facebook includes similar social
features which can be leveraged by CONSOL. Friends_count is directly available on
Facebook. Friends_count keeps track of how many friends a user has. It is listed under
“All Friends” in user’s profile. Followers feature is also available on Facebook whereby
followers can view the content posted by the user as public. Although content posted by
the user can be viewed without even following the user a user needs to search for the user
to see the posts. These posts are often buried under the posts by friends. Followers_count
is listed under the “Followers” tab under “friends” page. Favorites_count in Facebook
follows the approach of likes. It is related to the post and can be directly observed on the
posts. However, to obtain how much likes a user has made, one will have to search
through the user’s activity log. This requires extra processing but it can be achieved.
Statuses_count is available on Facebook too. Facebook provides the past 8 years
Statuses_count information.
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6.1.2

Content Features
Users generate content including photos, videos, status, etc. on Facebook. We are

interested in the content including short URLs in this research. Posts that contain short
URLs usually include keywords describing the content of the URLs. From these
keywords, we can extract content features. CONSOL particularly uses nine content
features, i.e., length_of_tweet, bag-of-words (check, watch, sex, klik, click, and
interested), number of hashtags, and number of URLs.
Length_of_tweet can be calculated using the length of the post on Facebook. Bagof-words can be looked upon the posts for keywords that fall in our bag-of-words.
Hashtags are also used on Facebook. Hashtags represent the topics that are in trending or
important. Hashtags can be found in posts and the number of hashtags can be counted.
Number_of_urls can be obtained from a post as well.
6.1.3

Context Features
Context is the background information that a post is based on. Context could be

happiness, sadness, excitement, announcements, advertisements, news, etc. CONSOL
uses 3 context features, i.e., in_reply_to_status, in_reply_to_user, and relevance.
Unlike Twitter, replies are directly commented under the same post.
In_reply_to_status can be retrieved using the post ID number. In_reply_to_user can be
derived from the post if the post contains tags. Posts are often tagged to a particular user.
It can be some funny messages, announcements, or hatred messages sometimes.
Relevance can be obtained from the trending field provided on Facebook. Trends can be
looked based on top trends on Facebook such as politics, science & technology, sports,
and entertainment.
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6.1.4

Facebook and CONSOL
As discussed in Table 4-6, CONSOL relies on 16 social network features to detect

malicious short URLs. From our discussion, we are able to map all 16 social network
features to corresponding information on Facebook. We are confident that CONSOL can
be effectively applied to Facebook.

6.2 Case II: Application to LinkedIn
LinkedIn is one of the most popular professional OSNs started in 2003. People
from different professions use LinkedIn to form professional networks, connect with their
peers, follow organizations of their interests, form/join group, and post messages and
comments. LinkedIn is also a platform where potential employers look for candidates for
their job openings. Users can search jobs and apply for jobs using LinkedIn service.
According to LinkedIn, there are more than 400 million members from more than 200
countries (Linkedin, 2015). It generated revenue worth $862 million in 2015.
Similar to Facebook, people create their profiles on LinkedIn with their personal
information including education, work experience, skills, publications, certifications, etc.
Users can write posts, like, and comments on posts, etc. The content posted on LinkedIn
often includes long and short URLs. CONSOL can also be applied on LinkedIn to detect
malicious short URLs.
6.2.1

Social Features
CONSOL uses four social features for short URL classification, i.e.,

Favorites_count, Friends_count, Followers_count, and Statuses_count. Favorites_count
can be achieved via searching through user activities on LinkedIn. However, the duration
of recent activities that can be viewed is changed constantly. The default is only 14 days.
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Friends_count is equivalent to connections on LinkedIn. Connection forms on LinkedIn
once a user accepts a request from another user. Followers_count can be retrieved
directly from LinkedIn. There are many ways to get this number. One way to find the
number of followers is to go to the Followers tab under activities. Statuses_count can also
be retrieved similarly. However, it also has the limitation of 14 days.
6.2.2

Content Features
CONSOL relies on nine content features for operation, i.e., length_of_tweet, bag-

of-words (check, watch, sex, klik, click, and interested), number of hashtags, number of
URLs. Length_of_tweet can be achieved directly by counting the words in a post. The
bag-of-words can be created based on the content of the posts. Hashtags are not popular
on LinkedIn. However, it is still applicable since it depends upon users generating posts.
Number_of_URLs can be directly retrieved from a post. However, the number of URLs
found is one in most cases.
6.2.3

Context Features
CONSOL relies upon three context features including in_reply_to_user,

in_reply_to_status, and relevance. In_reply_to_user can be retrieved similarly as
Facebook. It usually is under comments and contains tags. In_reply_to_status is the same
as comments on Facebook. Relevance is a complicated attribute to acquire on LinkedIn
since all the posts are “relevant”. Thus, we suggest using ‘1’ for relevance for all the
posts on LinkedIn.
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6.2.4

LinkedIn and CONSOL
From discussion above, we are able to map all 16 social network features to

LinkedIn with some minor challenges. We are confident that CONSOL can be applied to
LinkedIn for malicious short URL detection with a little bit more extra efforts.

6.3 Summary
CONSOL utilizes features available on online social networks to classify
malicious short URLs. Online social networks may operate in different business models.
However, they all follow the same principles. The information on OSNs can be divided
into content features, context features, and social features. These features can be used by
CONSOL for malicious URL detection. In our two case studies, we show that we are able
to map the information on Facebook and LinkedIn to the features used in the CONSOL.
Thus, we are confident that CONSOL can be applied to other online social networks as
well.
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Chapter 7 Conclusion and Future Work
Online social network is a place where people are willing to share information.
People share personal information, photos, news, announcements, etc. The shared
information often includes URLs. Due to the complicity of long URL, short URLs
become popular. Short URLs are alias of long URLs and ease the process of URL
sharing. However, there are also inherent risks using short URLs. Phishing, malware,
spams, and scams are common threats on OSNs. Short URLs have been used heavily to
carry on these attacks. Existing malicious URL filters work well with long URLs.
However, they do not work well with short URLs. OSNs fail to stop malicious short
URLs from being propagated via their services. This led to the topic of the dissertation.
In this dissertation, we design and develop a short URL classifier, CONSOL,
using the features available on OSNs. CONSOL utilizes content features, context
features, and social features to identify malicious short URLs. It uses backlist services
such as VirusTotal and PhishTank to label the data and train the classifier. However, the
classifier will operate on its own using the features from online social networks without
using any third party services once trained. Our testing shows that the classifier achieves
high accuracy in identifying malicious short URLs. The comparisons of the CONSOL
with the existing solution and Google Safe Browsing also show that the classifier is
promising in the real world. Our case studies further indicate that other online social
networks can also adopt the CONSOL with very minimal to no difficulty. The research in
the dissertation follows the design science principles. Data collection is facilitated with
python scripts using Twitter streaming APIs and Bitly APIs. We also leverage blacklist
services from VirusTotal and PhishTank.
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7.1 Research Questions
This dissertation answers the following research questions.
1.

How can we leverage the information available on OSNs to detect

malicious short URLs?
The motivation of this study is to design and develop a classifier for short URLs
using the information available solely from online social networks. Many existing
solutions leverage information from third party service providers. However, it is not
always possible to retrieve the desired information from a third service provide given that
there are hundreds of them on the Internet. On the other hand, there is huge amount of
information available on OSNs. The information is free and it is always accessible. In this
research, we divide the information from OSNs into three logical categories, i.e., content
features, context features, and social features. Using these features, we are able to
develop a classifier, CONSOL, for short URL classification. Our testing and comparisons
show that CONSOL achieves high accuracy in identifying malicious short URLs. This
shows our assertion “that detecting malicious short URLs is practical using information
from OSNs only since malicious short URLs propagate through OSNs leveraging social
relationships” is correct.
2.

What are the most important features for malicious short URL

detection?
Our classifier utilizes 16 features as shown in Table 4-6 Selected Features for
Random Forest with Filter Method for malicious URL identification. These 16 features
are further divided into three logical categories, i.e., content features, context features,
and social features. To find out which category is the most important for short URL
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classification, we performed experimental analysis on the three categories. We found that
social features are the most significant feature set among all the three categories. Social
features alone can predict short URLs with up to 91.47% accuracy (Table 5-2). Content
features are also important for identifying malicious short URLs. Content features alone
can predict short URLs with up to 70.58% accuracy. Among all the three categories,
context features are the weakest. However, each category of features is unique in nature
and contributes towards the overall performance of the classifier.
3.

How can we develop an effective mechanism to detect malicious short

URLs with high accuracy on OSNs?
In this research, our objective is to develop an effective classifier that can be used
to detect malicious short URLs on OSNs. Thus, accuracy is important for the design of
the classifier. As we demonstrated in Chapter 4, we are able to develop short URL
classifier using features from online social networks only. The classifier achieves 94.5%
accuracy using the Random Forest algorithm. The comparison of the classifier with the
existing solution and the Google Safe Browsing all indicates the effectiveness of the
classifier.
4.

Can the classifier be easily adapted/used in other social networks?

Our goal is to build a short URL classifier that works for online social networks in
general. In this research, we demonstrate the effectiveness of the classifier using the data
collected from Twitter. There are many OSNs on the Internet. They may operate on
different business models. However, the information on OSNs can all be classified into
three categories such as content features, context features, and social features. Thus,
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adopting the CONSOL in other OSNs is practicable. This has been demonstrated in our
two case studies using Facebook and LinkedIn in Chapter 6.

7.2 Implications
This study, to the best of our knowledge, is the first work to demonstrate that the
social network features alone can be used to classify short URLs. The implications of this
research are divided into twofold, i.e., theoretical implications and practical implications.
7.2.1

Theoretical Implications
This research implements the well-recognized principles and practices, and

applies them to malicious short URL detection context. The research elucidates the
importance of information available on OSNs in the security and particularly in the
detection of malicious short URLs. From the theoretical perspective, the research limits
the scope of contemporary URL classification study to online social networks. Using
experimental evidence, the research demonstrates that information from OSNs alone can
sufficiently and effectively classify short URLs, adding to the knowledge base.
The research also studies the impact of different categories of features in
classifying short URLs and shows that social features are the biggest contributor to the
classification of short URLs. Furthermore, the study also provides a reference, which
may assist future researchers to study security issues in online social networks.
7.2.2

Practical Implications
Without an artifact solving a real world Information Systems problem, a design

science research is nothing. With better understanding of the malicious short URL
domain, organizations can deploy effective security mechanism in their information
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systems. The findings of this research help security practitioners to effectively deploy
security mechanisms to prevent malicious short URLs from being propagated on OSNs.
The key practical implication of the research is listed as below.
We developed CONSOL; an OSN based short URL classifier, which can
effectively detect malicious short URLs on OSNs. We achieved an accuracy of up to
94.5% and a precision of 0.945.

7.3 Strengths and Limitations
This research is the first in-depth study of short URL classification using
information available on OSNs. The study shows that short URLs could be effectively
classified using the information from online social networks. The classifier does not
depend on any third parties during operations.
In general, the study identifies the key feature set used in the classifier from the
existing literature and our research findings. The study provides insight into the
importance of different feature sets and their predictive capacity to classify short URLs.
Finally, the study develops a short URL classifier, CONSOL, which achieves 94.5%
accuracy and outperforms any existing solutions in the literature. We are confident and
proved analytically that the CONSOL can also be adopted by other OSNs for short URL
classification.
One of the limitations in this study is that CONSOL uses third party information
for training. After the training, CONSOL does not depend on any information from third
parties other than the OSN.
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7.4 Future Research
A single study cannot extract all possible features from OSNs. This is especially
true when the objective is to develop a short URL classifier that can work in many
platforms with slight or no modification. Specifically, the features differ in different
online social networks. Hence, a large-scale exploratory research to study all directly
observed and derived feature sets can be very helpful in the short URL classification.
Bagging of different algorithms boosts the performance of the classifier and has
been studied well in the machine learning community. Bagging provides a mechanism to
leverage the performance of different machine learning algorithms and get the best of
each and stack them into a single classifier. How to implement bagging method to
improve the performance of the classifier will also be in our future research.

7.5 Summary
Securing social networking services is an important task as well as a big
challenge. Phishing, malware, spams, and scams have plagued the OSNs. This
dissertation addresses the short URL classification issue using the information available
on online social networks. We identify the features which can be leveraged in such a
classifier and show that in fact we are able effectively classify short URLs using the
features obtained from OSNs. We also evaluate the predictive power of different feature
sets and find that social features are the biggest contributors to the prediction of malicious
short URLs.
In conclusion, this study points out a new direction for short URL classification
by using the information obtained from OSNs. It helps future researchers to focus on
social networking services rather than third party services. Based on the findings of this
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dissertation, we believe that there are more prospective features on OSNs, which could be
leveraged by the classifier to improve its accuracy. We hope the findings of this research
will benefit the information security community and OSN security specifically.
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Appendices
Appendix I Tweet
Tweeter provides streaming APIs to access Tweet data. The individual
message/tweet streamed by the APIs are JSON encoded. A sample of the tweet is
enclosed below. It includes fields such as user, tweet, URLs, retweet, and user mentions.
Details of the tweet structure can be found at https://dev.twitter.com/overview/api/tweets.
{
"created_at":"Thu Feb 12 17:26:27 +0000 2015",
"id":565924909025881234,
"id_str":"565924909025882112",
"text":"RT @ElNacionalWeb: Urgente: Reportan 3 estudiantes heridos en San",
"source":"\u003ca href=\"http:\/\/www.twitter.com\" rel=\"nofollow\"\u003eTwitter for Windows
Phone\u003c\/a\u003e",
"truncated":false,
"in_reply_to_status_id":null,
"user":
{
"id":123456789, ## Edited to preserve user privacy
"id_str":"123456789",
"name":"Leo \u0950",
"screen_name":"ABC_XYZ", ## Edited to preserve user privacy
"location":"",
"url":null,
"description":"\u2022Hispano -Europeo\u2022FuturoOdontologo
\u2022Basquetbolista \u2022Caraquista y dedicado a mi estudios y familia",
"protected":false,
"verified":false,"followers_count":194,"friends_count":188,"listed_count":0,"favourites_count":49
7,"statuses_count":5153,
"created_at":"Fri Jan 14 15:28:32 +0000 2011",
"utc_offset":-36000,
"time_zone":"Hawaii",
"retweeted_status":
{
"created_at":"Thu Feb 12 17:07:11 +0000 2015",
"id":565920062734106624,
"id_str":"565920062734106624",
"text":"Urgente: Reportan 3 estudiantes heridos en San
Crist\u00f3bal este #12F http:\/\/t.co\/PDYIYVPhQO (V\u00eda: @elpropioweb)",
"source":"\u003ca href=\"http:\/\/www.hootsuite.com\"
rel=\"nofollow\"\u003eHootsuite\u003c\/a\u003e",
"truncated":false,
"in_reply_to_status_id":null,
"user":
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{
"id":234567890, ## Edited to preserve
user privacy
"id_str":"234567890",
"name":"XYZ",
"screen_name":"XYZ",
"location":"Caracas - Venezuela",
"url":"http:xyz.com ",
"description":"Te informamos sobre las
noticias m\u00e1s recientes de Venezuela y el mundo, Deportes",
"protected":false,
"verified":true,
"followers_count":2870085,
"friends_count":367144,
"listed_count":15756,
"favourites_count":3722,
"statuses_count":815087,
"created_at":"Wed Jun 04 17:03:00 +0000
2008",
},
"geo":null,
"coordinates":null,
"place":null,
"contributors":null,
"retweet_count":238,
"favorite_count":10,
"entities":
{
"hashtags":[
{
"text":"12F",
"indices":[62,66]}],
"trends":[],
"urls":[
{
"url":"http:\/\/t.co\/PDYIYVPhQO",
"expanded_url":"http:\/\/Bitly.com\/1CZF3KP","display_url":"Bitly.com\/1CZF3KP",
"indices":[67,89]
}
],
"user_mentions":[
{
"screen_name":"TYR", ## Edited to preserve user privacy
"name":"TYR", ## Edited to preserve user privacy
"id":456789012, ## Edited to preserve user privacy
"id_str":"456789012", ## Edited to preserve user privacy
"indices":[96,108]}],
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"symbols":[]
},
"favorited":false,
"retweeted":false,
"possibly_sensitive":false,
"filter_level":"low"
},
"retweet_count":0,
"favorite_count":0,
"entities":
{
"hashtags":[
{
"text":"12F",
"indices":[81,85]}],
"trends":[],
"urls":[
{
"url":"http:\/\/t.co\/PDYIYVPhQO",
"expanded_url":"http:\/\/Bitly.com\/1CZF3KP",
"display_url":"Bitly.com\/1CZF3KP",
"indices":[86,108]}],
"user_mentions":[
{
"screen_name":"MNO", ## Edited to preserve user privacy
"name":"MNO", ## Edited to preserve user privacy
"id":15000000, ## Edited to preserve user privacy
"id_str":"15000000", ## Edited to preserve user privacy
"indices":[3,17]
},
{
"screen_name":"PQR", ## Edited to preserve user privacy
"name":"PQR", ## Edited to preserve user privacy
"id":000000000, ## Edited to preserve user privacy
"id_str":"000000000", ## Edited to preserve user privacy
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"indices":[115,127]}],
"symbols":[]
},
"favorited":false,
"retweeted":false,
"possibly_sensitive":false,
"filter_level":"low",
"lang":"es",
"timestamp_ms":"1423761987345"
}
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Appendix II Sample Dataset
In this research, we create different datasets as shown in Table 4-4 Datasets and
Description for our testing and evaluation purpose. A sample of the dataset is enclosed
below. The dataset includes 16 fields as shown in Table 4-6 Selected Features for
Random Forest with Filter Method. These 16 fields fall into three categories, i.e., context
features, context features, and social features. These 16 fields are derived from raw tweet
data collected form Twitter using its streaming APIs. The last column in the table
indicates the malignity of the tweet, 1 for malicious and 0 for benign.
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